Cerritos Trucking Co., Et Al. v. Utah Venture No. 1, Et Al. And Utah Development Company, Inc., Et Al. v. Bettilyon Realty Company, Et Al. : Brief of Cross Defendant-Respondent, Bettilyon Realty by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
Cerritos Trucking Co., Et Al. v. Utah Venture No. 1,
Et Al. And Utah Development Company, Inc., Et
Al. v. Bettilyon Realty Company, Et Al. : Brief of
Cross Defendant-Respondent, Bettilyon Realty
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Joseph C. Rust; Attorney for Cross Defendant Dunahoo-
RespondentsGary A. Weston; Attorney for Cross Defendant Bettilyon-RespondentRobert A.
Attorney for Defendants and Cross Plaintiffs-Appellants
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cerritos Trucking v. Utah Venture No. 1, No. 17185 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2407
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CERRITOS TRUCKING co., et al.' 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
UTAH VENTURE NO. 1, et al., 
Defendants-
Appellants. No. 17185 
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., et al., 
vs. 
Cross Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
BETTILYON REALTY COMPANY, et al., 
Cross Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF C,ROSS DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, 
BETTILYON REALTY 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Peter F. Leary 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
ROBERT A. PETERSON 
SO South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Cross Plaintiffs-Appellants 
TANNER, KESLER, RUST 
& WILLIAMS 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
GARY A. WESTON 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Cross Defendant-
Respondent, Bettilyon Realty 
F ~LED 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents and 
Cross Defendant-Respondent Dunahoo 
MAR 13 1981 
--····------------------------------··---
Clor~ S•;>••rM Court, U;oh Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CERRITOS TRUCKING CO., et al., 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
UTAH VENTURE NO. 1, et al. , 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., et al., 
No. 17185 
Cross Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
BETTILYON REALTY COMPANY, et al., 
Cross Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF CROSS DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, 
BETTILYON REALTY 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Peter F. Leary 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
ROBERT A. PETERSON 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Cross Plaintiffs-Appellants 
TANNER, KESLER, RUST 
& WILLIAMS 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
GARY A. WESTON 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Cross Defendant-
Respondent, Bettilyon Realty 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents and 
Cross Defendant-Respondent Dunahoo 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT .. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CAN GRANT A DIRECTED VERDICT 
IF THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF APPELLANTS' CLAIMS 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING CROSS 
DEFENDANT BETTILYON A DIRECTED VERDICT ON 
APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT BETTILYON BREACHED A 
DUTY OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE 
A. 
B. 
POINT III 
BETTILYON AND APPELLANT LOWENBERG WERE 
NOT IN A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
EVEN IF BETTILYON WERE IN A FIDUCIARY 
RELATION TO LOWENBERG, THERE WAS NO BREACH 
OF A DUTY OF TRUST ANO CONFIDENCE . . . . 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF BETTILYON ON APPELLANTS' 
CLAIM OF MISREPRESENTATION 
A. THERE WAS NO MISREPRESENTATION OF A 
PRESENTLY EXISTING FACT 
B APPELLANTS CANNOT MAKE A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION SINCE THIS CLAIM IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR THEORY THAT A 
MISREPRESENTATION WAS MADE OF A PRESENTLY 
c. 
EXISTING FACT 
EVEN IF APPELLANTS DO HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, BETTILYON, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, MADE NO NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION . . . · . · · · · • · · 
Page 
l 
2 
2 
2 
8 
9 
11 
12 
14 
15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
AUTHORITcES CITED 
CASES 
Anderson v. Thatcher, 76 Cal. App.2d 50, 
172 P.2d 533 (1946) .... 
Barber's Super Markets, Inc. v. Stryker, 
84 N.M. 181, 500 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App. 1972) 
Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 
607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980) 
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951 (Utah 1978) 
Christensen v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 
83 Utah 231, 27 P.2d 468 (1933) 
FMA v. Build Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965) 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp, 
423 P. 2d 659 (1967) , 
18 Utah 2d 378, 
Mel Hardman Productions v. Robinson, 
(Utah 1979) . . . . . 
604 P.2d 913 
Mood v. Myers, 48 Wash.2d 476, 296 P.2d 525 (1956) 
Roylance v. Davies, 18 Utah 2d 395, 
424 P.2d 142 (1967) 
Schrow v. Guardstone, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 134, 
417 P.2d 643 (1966) 
Smith v. Howard, 158 Cal. App.2d 343, 
322 P.2d 1034 (1958) .... 
l8 
14 
12' ll 
17 
15' l7 
13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CERRITOS TRUCKING CO., et al., 
vs. 
Plaintiffs 
Respondents, 
UTAH VENTURE NO. l, et al., 
Defendants 
Appellants. No. 17185 
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., et al. , 
vs. 
Cross Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
BETTILYON REALTY COMPANY, et al., 
Cross Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF CROSS DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
BETTILYON REALTY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs-respondents seek from the defendants-
appellants damages and specific performance of an option to 
purchase real property; the defendants-appellants seek 
rescission of said option and, in the alternative, damages 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
against plaintiffs-respondents and cross defendants-respondents 
based upon misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Following a trial by jury, the district court granted 
directed verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and cross 
defendants and against the defendants, counterclaimants, and 
cross claimants and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The cross defendant-respondent, Bettilyon Realty and 
Investment Company, herein referred to as Bettilyon Realty 
Company, seeks to sustain the directed verdict of the district 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The cross defendant-respondent, Bettilyon Realty, 
agrees with the statement of facts as set forth as part of the 
Statement of the Case Nith Citations to the Record in the brief 
of the appellants and as modified and supplemented by the 
Statement of the Case as set forth in the brief of the 
plaintiffs-respondents and the cross defendant-respondent, 
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l 
Dunahoo, except with regard to those facts and circumstances as 
are specifically considered below. 
The appellant, William J. Lowenberg, is a real estate 
broker, having been so licensed in the State of California for 
some 30 years and with most of his experience being in the 
development of his own properties. (Tr. p. S2; testimony of 
Lowenberg). He has had significant experience in development of 
warehouses and industrial property in California prior to 
venturing into the State of Utah (Tr. pp. S3, S4; testimony of 
Lowenberg). He generally utilizes realtors only to locate 
potential tenants for his developments, and he normally 
determines his own price and terms. (Tr. pp. SS, S6; testimony 
of Lowenberg). In requesting assistance from Bettilyon Realty, 
Lowenberg advised he had some space and, if it had anybody 
interested, to come and see him. He did not sign any real 
estate listing agreement with Bettilyon. (Tr. p. S8; testimony 
of Lowenberg). The only agreement between Lowenberg and 
Bettilyon Realty was a letter dated February 21, 1978, prepared 
and mailed to Lowenberg by Bettilyon's sales representative, 
Gerald F. Daughtrey (Tr. p. S9; testimony of Lowenberg). That 
letter reads as follows: 
Dear Bill: 
This letter is to confirm our telephone conversation of 
February 17, 1978, registering my client, Fiber Science 
Inc., a Division of EDO Corporation of New York, for 
you[r] development in the Salt Lake International 
Center. 
-3-
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(Ex. 9-D) 
The commission schedule is 
gross lease. 
5% of sale orice or 5% of 
) 
I am looking forward to placing a client in your 
development. 
Please execute and return original. 
Cordially, 
Gerald F. Daughtrey 
[Emphasis added] 
Fiber Science had requested the assistance of Bettilyoo 
Realty in locating space in Salt Lake City for its business 
operations. Bettilyon's representative, Gerald Daughtrey, 
showed the officers of Fiber Science the Lowenberg property. In 
April of 1978, Edmond Dunahoo, president of Fiber Science, met 
in Salt Lake City with Donald Heimark, (Tr. p. 138; testimony 
of Dunahoo) an officer of Cerritos Trucking. (Tr. p. 65; 
testimony of Heimark). Fiber Science was interested in leasing 
the Lowenberg property. (Tr. p. 140; testimony of Dunahoo). 
Heimark was a personal friend of Dunahoo and had been advised by 
the latter that Fiber Science was planning on moving its 
business operation to Salt Lake City. Heimark had determined 
that Cerritos Trucking might be interested in purchasing the 
Lowenberg property for investment purposes. (Tr. J?• 66; 
testimony of Heimark). Cerritos Trucking determined that it 
wished to make an offer to purchase the Lowenberg property with 
the intention of subsequently leasing a portion to Fiber 
Science. (Tr. p. 70; testimony of Heimark; Tr. p. 140; 
testimony of Dunahoo). Daughtrey had presented to Lowenberg a 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
verbal offer from Fiber Science to lease a portion of the 
building at 13 1/2¢ a sq. ft. which offer was rejected by 
Lowenberg. (Tr. pp. 125 and 288; testimony of Daughtrey; Tr. p. 
289; testimony of Lowenberg). Fiber Science did not thereafter 
again attempt to lease the building from Lowenberg. (Tr. p. 
150; testimony of Dunahoo). There were two reasons why Dunahoo 
made no further attempts on behalf of Fiber Science to lease the 
property from Lowenberg: first, because Dunahoo was interested 
in participating with other Fiber Science officers in the 
purchase of the property (Tr. p. 168; testimony of Dunahoo}; 
second, because Fiber Science needed assurances that it could 
expand into additional space in the building if the need arose, 
and Dunahoo believed that the additional space would be made 
available if the Fiber Science lease was with Cerritos 
(Tr. pp. 169 and 170; testimony of Dunahoo). 
Lowenberg had told Daughtrey that he would not guarantee the 
availability of additional space in the building. (Tr. p. 123; 
testimony of Daughtrey). 
In response to the meeting between Heimark and Dunahoo, 
Daughtrey submitted to Lowenberg a written offer for the 
purchase of the subject property by Cerritos Trucking Company. 
(Tr. pp. 70 and 71; testimony of Heimark; Ex. 3-P). Thereafter, 
a verbal agreement was reached between Mr. Lowenberg and 
Cerritos Trucking for the lease of the subject property to 
Cerritos Trucking with an option to purchase. On or about April 
28, 1978, Lowenberg and Cerritos Trucking executed the lease and 
-5-
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Lowenberg executed the option to purchase· The opt ion agreement 
had been prepared by Lowenberg's attorneys at his personal 
direction. (Tr. pp. 223 and 224; testimony of Lowenberg). On 
or about the same date, Cerritos Trucking sublet a portion of 
the building to Fiber Science pursuant to written agreement, 
(Ex. 10-P). 
In about January of 1979, Lowenberg and Daughtrey 
learned that neither Dunahoo nor any of the other Fiber Science 
officers would be participating with Cerritos Trucking in the 
purchase of the property under the option. (Tr. pp. 211, 213, 
273 and 274; testimony of Daughtrey). Thereafter, Cerritos 
Trucking exercised its option to purchase, and Lowenberg refused 
to complete conveyance of the property, alleging that he had 
granted the option for the purchase of the property wi~h the 
understanding that the Fiber Science officers would participate 
in the purchase and that, in the absence of that participation, 
he no longer was obligated to sell and convey. 
With particular reference to the Statement of Facts as 
set forth in the appellants' brief, it is therein represented 
that Daughtrey told Lowenberg that the Fiber Science group would 
own or participate in the ownership of the property. Mr. 
Daughtrey's testimony was that during the meeting in 
approximately the middle of 1978, in which he, Mr. Dunahoo, Mr. 
Lowenberg and others were present, Mr. Lowenberg was told either 
by himself or Mr. Dunahoo that Fiber Science officers did want 
to participate. (Tr. pp. 127 and 128; testimony of Daughtrey). 
-6-
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There was no representation by Daughtrey that the property would 
in fact be owned by the Fiber Science group. The appellant 
further represents that Daughtrey negotiated the option between 
Lowenberg and Cerritos Trucking. However, the evidence before 
the court was that Daughtrey neither determined the option price 
nor the length of the lease (Tr. p. 133; testimony of 
Daughtrey). He was neither involved in making recommendations 
to Lowenberg nor negotiating terms, but rather only in relaying 
information between Lowenberg and Cerritos Trucking. (Tr. pp. 
117 and 286; testimony of Daughtrey; Tr. pp. 55 and 56; 
testimony of Lowenberg). Although Daughtrey advised Lowenberg 
that it was his understanding that the Fiber Science officers 
intended to participate in the property, it was at no time 
represented by Daughtrey that a lease by Fiber Science was 
conditional upon the property being sold to its officers. (Tr. 
pp. 207, 208 and 278; testimony of Daughtrey). While Mr. 
Lowenberg testified that he was unwilling to grant an option to 
purchase to anyone other than the officers of Fiber Science, 
such alleged intention was never communicated to either Mr. 
Daughtrey or the officers of Cerritos Trucking. (Tr. p. 106; 
testimony of Heimark; Tr. p. 275; testimony of Daughtrey). Mr. 
Dunahoo testified that he was not certain he had ever met 
Lowenberg. (Tr. p. 171; testimony of Dunahoo). It is obvious, 
therefore, that Lowenberg had made no such representation to him. 
-7-
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POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CAN GRANT A DIRECTED VERDICT IF' THERE IS NIJ 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' CLAI~S 
When there is no substantial dispute in the evidence 
and when the court can say as a matter of law that reasonable 
persons could find only one way on the facts, then it is the 
duty of the court to determine the applicable law and direct the 
jury to return a verdict under the law and the facts presented. 
Roylance v. Davies, 18 Utah 2d 395, 424 P.2d 142 (1967). 
Granting a motion for directed verdict is justified if there is 
no substantial basis in the evidence which would support a 
verdict for the non-moving party. Mel Hardman Productions v. 
Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979). 
Only if there is some substantial evidence in support 
of the essential facts which the defendant Lowenburg is required 
to prove in order to entitle him to recover is the question one 
of fact for the jury rather than one of law for the court. 
Christensen v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Utah 231, 27 P.2:l 468, 
471 (1933). "Substantial evidence is that which would convince 
an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the fact to whicl 
the evidence is directed." Mood v. Myers, 48 Wash. 2d 476, 296 
P.2d 525 (1956). 
-8-
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING CROSS-DEFENDANT 
3ETTILYON A DIRECTED VERDICT ON APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT 
BETTILYON BREACHED A DUTY OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE 
A. BETTILYON AND APPELLANT LOWENBERG WERE NOT 
IN A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
Defendant Lowenberg failed to introduce any substantial 
evidence supporting the claim that Bettilyon was in a fiduciary 
relation to him. If a real estate agent is a middleman, no 
fiduciary relation to either principal exists. Barber's Super 
Markets, Inc. v. Stryker, 84 N.M. 181, 500 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App. 
1972). The real estate agent is a middleman if employed for the 
mere purpose of bringing the possible buyer and seller t0gether 
so that they may negotiate their own contract. Stryker, suora, 
at 1311. The middleman's duties are limited by his contract to 
finding and procuring a purchaser able, willing, and ready to 
accept the client's terms, or to effect a transaction with his 
client on any terms satisfactory to both parties. Smith v. 
Howard, 158 Cal. App. 2d 343, 322 P.2d 1034 (1958). In such a 
case, the broker has nothing to do with the trade. His advice 
is not needed. Anderson v. Thatcher, 76 Cal. App. 2d 50, 172 
P.2d 533 (1946). The principal does not rely on the broker for 
the benefit of his skill or judgment. Stryker, supra. The 
broker is not entitled to use discretionary authority for the 
benefit of his employer. Smith, supra. 
-9-
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Mr. Lowenberg has had substantial experience in the 
real estate business. (Tr. pp. 51, 53, 54; testimony oE 
Lowenberg). He has been a licensed real estate broker in the 
State of California for over a 30-year period. (Tr. p. 52; 
testimony of Lowenberg). Bettilyon an<i Lowenberg did not enter 
into any sales agency contract or listing agreement. (Tr. p. 
58; testimony of Lowenberg). Mr. Lowenberg contacted a number 
of real estate agencies, including Bettilyon, notifying them 
that he had space available, and to "bring me a tenant." (Tr. 
p. 59; testimony of Lowenberg). 
Mr. Lowenberg did not authorize Daughtrey to negotiate 
on his behalf; he simply wanted him to find a potential tenant 
at his terms. (Tr. p. 55; testimony of Lowenberg). Mr. 
Lowenberg is experienced and sophisticated in the real estate 
business and did not rely on the advice or skill of Gerald 
Daughtrey. Lowenberg himself set his own price and terms. (Tr. 
p. 56; testimony of Lowenberg). Mr. Daughtrey was "just an 
errand boy passing the information back and forth." 
117; testimony of Daughtrey). 
(Tr. P· 
Mr. Lowenberg introduced no substantial evidence 
showing that he vested any discretion in Daughtrey to negotiate 
on his behalf or that he counseled with him or placed any 
reliance on his advice. Rather, he relied on his own experience 
and judgment. Therefore, there existed no fiduciary relation 
between Bettilyon and Lowenberg. 
-10-
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B. EVEN IF BETTILYON WERE IN A FIDUCIARY RELATION TO 
LOWENBERG, THERE WAS NO BREACH OF A DUTY OF TRUST AND 
CONFIDENCE 
Even if Bettilyon were in a fiduciary relation to Mr. 
Lowenberg, Bettilyon breached no duty of care. Lowenberg claims 
that Bettilyon breached its fiduciary duty since Daughtrey 
failed to lease the property to Fiber Science, as Lowenberg 
desired, but, instead, directed his efforts towards arranging a 
purchase of the property. However, as stated above, it was not 
within the scope of Daughtrey's responsibilities to negotiate on 
behalf of Lowenberg. Lowenberg conducted his own negotiations. 
Daughtrey's duties were limited to presenting offers, relaying 
messages, and obtaining signatures from the parties. 
Lowenberg's attorney prepared the option agreement. 
testimony of Lowenberg). 
(Tr. p. 29; 
Lowenberg also claims that Bettilyon breached its 
fiduciary duty since Daughtrey had failed to inform Lowenberg 
that Fiber Science would have leased the property whether or not 
a purchase option was granted to its officers. This claim, 
however, is inconsistent with the evidence. Lowenberg was aware 
tnat Fiber Science was interested in leasing the property. 
Lowenberg testified that Daughtrey had presented to him a verbal 
offer from Fiber Science to lease part of the building. (Tr. P· 
289; testimony of Lowenberg). Lowenberg rejected this offer. 
Subsequently, Fiber Science did not extend any further offers to 
-11-
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Lowenberg to lease the property. Later Fiber Science leasej 
part of the building from Cerritos Associates. Fiber Science, 
in part, did not lease directly from Lowenberg because Lowenbeq 
could not guarantee Fiber Science the availability of additional 
space it may have needed for future expansion. (Tr. p. 170; 
testimony of Dunahoo; Tr. p. 123; testimony of Daughtrey). 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A VERDICT IN FAVOR 
OF BETTILYON ON APPELLANTS' CLAI~ OF MISREPRESENTATION 
A. THERE WAS NO MISREPRESENTATION OF A PRESE~TLY 
EXISTING FACT 
The trial court was correct in granting a directed 
verdict in favor of Bettilyon since Lowenberg failed to produce 
substantial evidence of each of the required elements of fraud: 
(1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; ( 3) which was false: 
(4) which the one making the misrepresentation either 
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly knowing he 
had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it; (G) that the other party 
acting reasonably and in ignor:ince of its falsity: (7) 
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced 
to act; (9) to its injury and damage." 
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978). Each element 
of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
Cheever, supra. Therefore, the directed verdict is incorrect 
only if there is substantial evidence to meet Lowenberg's burden 
of clear and convincing proof. 
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Lowenberg claims that Daughtrey misrepresented that the 
option to purchase was for the benefit of the officers of Fiber 
Science and that those individuals would own or participate in 
the ownership of the property upon exercising the option. It is 
not disputed that Daughtrey did present an offer to Lowenberg 
from Cerritos Trucking for a lease and an option to purchase in 
which it was intended that the officers of Fiber Science would 
participate to some degree in ownership of the building. 
Lowenberg's fraud claim is clearly inadequate since no 
misrepresentation was made of a presently existing material 
fact. Cheever, supra. Daughtrey simply presented to Lowenberg 
an offer, which he accepted, for Cerritos Trucking to have a 
lease on the property and an option to purchase. When the 
option was set up, Dunahoo and Heimark intended and so advised 
Daughtrey that the officers of Fiber Science were to participate 
in the ownership of the property. (Tr. pp. 153 and 158; 
testimony of Dunahoo; Tr. pp. 88-90; testimony of Heimark; Tr. 
p. 130; testimony of Daughtrey). Daughtrey relayed this to 
Lowenberg. At the most, this was a representation of 
intention. The only premise upon which that representation can 
be actionable as fraud is if, at the time it was made, Daughtrey 
actually did not intend that the officers of Fiber Science would 
participate in ownership of the property. Schrow v. Guardstone, 
~ 18 Utah 2d 134, 417 P.2d 643, 645(1966). An expression of 
an intention to perform is actionable as fraud only if the 
representation of intention was contrary to the actual intention 
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of those making the representation. Berkeley Bank for 
Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980). Lowenberg 
would have to prove that at the time Daughtrey made the 
representation that Daughtrey, Dunahoo, and Heimark intended ~e 
officers would participate in ownership, they actually did not 
so intend. Thus, Lowenberg would have to prove that Daughtrey 
had an actual intent to deceive. However, absolutely no 
evidence was introduced that Daughtrey did not intend at the 
time of the execution of the option that the officers of Fiber 
Science would not participate in ownership of the property or 
that Daughtrey attempted to actually deceive Lowenberg into 
believing that the officers would participate in ownership. 
B. APPELLANTS CANNOT MAKE A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION SINCE T~IS CLAIM IS INCONSISTE:CJT Wl7l 
THEIR THEORY THAT A MISREPRESENTATION WAS MADE OF A 
PRESENTLY EXISTING FACT 
As stated above, for Lowenberg to be successful on a 
fraud action he must prove that a misrepresentation was made of 
a presently existing fact. Since the alleged misrepresentation 
made in this case was an expression of an intention to perform 
in the future, Lowenberg, to be successful on his claim, must 
prove that Daug!1trey actually intended to deceive Lowenberg. 
Lowenberg would have to prove that Daughtrey actually did not 
intend that the officers of Fiber Science would participate in 
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ownership of the property even though he represented that his 
intention was that they would participate. This is a 
requirement of actual deceit. Since Lowenberg must prove actual 
deceit by Daughtrey, a claim of a negligent misrepresentation is 
not available as a cause of action. When the alleged 
misrepresentation is an expression of an intention, actual 
deceit is required for a misrepresentation cause of action. A 
negligent misrepresentation could not fulfill the required 
element that there must be misrepresentation of a presently 
existing fact. 
C. EVEN IF APPELLANTS DO HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, BETTILYON, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, MADE NO NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The elements of negligent misrepresentation must be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Jardine v. Brunswick 
S?.E.2·· 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967). Therefore, the 
directed verdict is incorrect only if there is substantial 
evidence to meet Lowenberg's burden of clear and convincing 
proof. 
Defendant Lowenberg failed to present substantial 
evidence that Daughtrey made a negligent misrepresentation. 
Daughtrey presented an offer to Lowenberg in which it was 
anticipated that the officers of Fiber Science would participate 
in ownership of the property. The officers had a good faith 
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reasonable basis to believe that they could participate. The 
president of Fiber Science testified: 
Q. All right. Now, you were the president of Fiber 
Science at this time, as you've earlier testified. 
What made you believe that you could participate in 
ownership of the building that was being leased to your 
own company? 
A. My understanding of the corporate policy was if it 
were an arms-length deal that it would be satisfactory 
to be involved in such an arrangement. 
Q. Did you believe that this was an arms-length deal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On what basis? 
A. Because we had negotiated the lease with Cerritos 
Trucking that was less than was being required for ~e 
building originally. 
(Tr. pp. 143-144; testimony of Dunahoo). 
Daughtrey reasonably and in good faith presented the 
offer to Lowenberg. Lowenberg must prove that Daughtrey 
reasonably should have known that the officers of Fiber Scien~ 
did not intend to participate. There was no evidence produced 
that the officers of Fiber Science actually did not intend to 
participate. Daughtrey simply presented an offer. He had no 
reason to know or suspect that the officers of Fiber Science 
could not participate or did not intend to participate. He kn~ 
nothing of the corporate policy of Fiber Science preventing 
officers from participating. He had no duty to conduct an 
investigation to determine the actual intentions of the officers 
of Fiber Sciences. Re has no duty to make a legal determinatioo 
of the capacity of officers of a corporation to lease property 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to their own corporation. He simply informed Lowenberg of a 
proposed offer which he can reasonably do without verifying the 
capacity of the buyer to perform the offer. A broker does not 
grarantee a buyer's performance. FMA v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 
80, 404 P.2d 670(1965). 
Additionally, Lowenberg negligently failed to protect 
his own interest. 
In regard to this alleged cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation, it is pertinent to keep in mind that 
there is recognized a defense somewhat analogous to 
contributory negligence in other tort actions. The one 
who complains of being injured by such a false 
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true 
whatever is told him, but has the duty of exercising 
such degree of care to protect his own interests as 
would be exercised by an ordinary, reasonable and 
prudent person under the circumstances; and if he fails 
to do so, is precluded from holding someone else to 
account for the consequences of his own neglect. 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659(1967). 
Lowenberg "was no neophyte, but was a man of 
considerable business experience." See Jardine, suora. 
Lowenberg failed to inquire whether Fiber Sciences would still 
lease the property if he did not extend an option to purchase to 
its officers. This failure to inquire is clearly negligent 
since Fiber Science had previously made an offer to lease which 
Lowenberg rejected (Tr. p. 289; testimony of Lowenberg), and 
Lowenberg, therefore, knew that Fiber Science was interested in 
leasing. 
Lowenberg's attorney prepared the option. (Tr. p. 29; 
testimony of Lowenberg). Lowenberg could easily have assured 
the participation of ownership of the officers of Fiber Science 
~y including in the option a restrictive assignment clause. 
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Lowenberg presented no substantial evidence of a 
negligent misrepresentation by Daughtrey. Even if there were, 
Lowenberg's own negligence in failing to inquire as to the 
possibility of a lease and in failing to direct his e1ttorney to 
insert a restrictive assignment in the option would deny him :he 
relief he seeks. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants failed to present substantial evidence in 
support of each element of their claims; therefore, the trial 
court was correct in granting respondent Bettilyon a motion for 
directed verdict. 
~IELSEN & SENIOR 
Gary .2\. Weston 
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